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THE ROLE OF RACE, POVERTY, INTELLECTUAL 
DISABILITY, AND MENTAL ILLNESS IN 'fHE DECLINE 
OF THE DEATH PENALTY 
Stephen B. Bright * 
INTRODUCTION 
Capital punishment is a difficult and sensitive topic because it 
involves terrible tragedies, the murder of innocent people, loss 
and suffering, and the passions of the moment. It is used in only a 
very small percentage of cases in which it could be imposed and is 
currently in decline. Six states have recently abandoned it, and 
the number of death sentences imposed in the country decreased 
from over 300 per year in the mid-1990s to less than eighty in the 
last several years. 1 And so it is appropriate for us to ask whether 
death remains an appropriate punishment in a modern society, 
whether it is fairly carried out without race and poverty influenc-
ing who dies, and whether it is imposed only upon the most incor-
rigible offenders who commit the most heinous crimes. 
The current state of the death penalty raises many concerns. 
For one, it is a fairly primitive punishment. Before prisons, socie-
ty punished people by executing them, putting them in stocks, 
branding them, lashing them, and cutting off fingers and ears or 
even severing a limb. 2 The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth 
* President and Senior Counsel, Southern Center for Human Rights, Atlanta, Geor-
gia; Harvey Karp Visiting Lecturer, Yale Law School. The author's curriculum vitae and 
publications are available at www.law.yale.edu/faculty/SBright.htm. 
This essay was adapted from the keynote address given at Allen Chair Symposium, on 
October 24, 2014, at the University of Richmond School of Law. Parts of this essay and 
speech have been previously presented by Professor Bright, including at the United Na-
tions Headquarters on April 24, 2014. 
1. Death Penalty Trends, AMNESTY INT'L, http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/issu 
es/death-penalty/us-death-penalty-facts/death-penalty-trends (last visited Feb. 27, 2015). 
2. See James A Cox, Bilboes, Brands, and Branks: Colonial Crimes and Punish-
ments, COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG, http://www.history.org/foundation/journal/spring03/bra 
nks.cfm (last visited Feb. 27, 2015); see also Punishment-Theories of Punishment, Further 
Readings: The Imposition of Hardship in Response to Misconduct, http://law.jrank.org/pa 
ges/9578/Punishment.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2015). 
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Amendment provides that no person shall be "twice put in jeop-
ardy of life or limb."'3 Because of this provision, originalists may 
argue that the severing of limbs is constitutionally permissible 
today as punishment for a crime, but most Americans would not 
countenance it any more than they would branding, lashing, and 
other punishments used at the time the Constit1ition was adopt-
ed. Society has abandoned all of these primitive punishments ex-
cept death. But Americans have never been completely comforta-
ble with putting people to death, and for good reason. 1 
After the botched execution of Clayton Locket in Oklahoma,5 
President Barack Obama addressed significant problems with the 
death penalty: 
In the application of the death penalty in this country, we have seen 
significant problems-racial bias, uneven application of the death 
penalty ... situations in which there were individuals on death row 
who later on were discovered to have been innocent because of ex-
culpatory evidence .... And all these ... do raise significant ques-
tions about how the death penalty is being applied.6 
President Obama asked Attorney General Eric Holder to prepare 
a report regarding these questions. 7 The Attorney General indi-
cated he was going to look not just at the mechanics of carrying 
out an execution, but also examine some of the larger issues the 
President mentioned.8 
Most critical is the racial bias in the discretionary decisions of 
law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges, and juries. Over 
half of those on death rows are members of racial minorities, 9 and 
the Supreme Court has accepted racial disparities in the infliction 
3. U.S. CONST., amend. V. 
4. See Shrinking Majority of Americans Support Death Penalty, PEW RES. CTR.: 
RELIGION & Pun. LIFI' (Mar. 28, 2014), http://www.pewforum.org/2014/03/28/shrinking-
majority-of-americans-support-death-penalty/. 
5. See Erik Eckholm, One Execution Botched, Oldahoma Delays the Next, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 29, 2014, at Al. 
6. Peter Baker, Obama Orders Policy Review on Executions, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 
2014, at Al. 
7. Id. 
8. Benjamin Goad, Obama's Death Penalty Review Rishs Backlash from the States, 
THE HILL (June 8, 2014, 10:31 AM), http://thehill.com/regulation/administration/208567-
obamas-death-penalty-review-risks-backlash-from-the-states. 
9. Facts About the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Jan. 22, 2015), http: 
//www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (showing 42% of those on death 
rows are black and 13% Hispanic). 
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of the death penalty as "inevitable."J0 Prosecutors continue to use 
jury strikes to keep racial minorities from fully participating as 
jurors in capital trials. 11 
If he looks, Attorney General Holder will find the uneven appli-
cation about which the President expressed concern. Eighty per-
cent of the executions that have taken place since 1976 have been 
in the South; there were only four executions in the Northeast 
during that time period. 12 He will find that just two percent of the 
counties in the United States are responsible for a majority of 
those on death row and a majority of the executions that have 
taken place since 1976.J:i That is, 66 of the 3143 counties in the 
United States account for over half the executions that have tak-
en place. Ji Fifteen percent of counties account for all executions 
since 1976, and-as of January 1, 2013-20% account for all of 
the 3125 people on death row. 15 So while thirty-two states have 
laws providing for the death penalty, only 20% of the counties are 
responsible for the people that are under death sentences. JG This 
is contrary to Supreme Court holdings that the Eighth Amend-
ment requires that the death penalty must be imposed "fairly, 
and with reasonable consistency, or not at all."J7 
The attorney general will also find, as the President observed, 
that many people who were sentenced to death were later found 
to be innocent. 18 Among them is Glenn Ford, a black man, who 
was released in March 2014 from Louisiana's notorious Angola 
Prison after serving thirty years on death row for a crime he did 
10. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312 (1987). 
11. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan, Study Finds Blachs Bloched From Southern Juries, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 2, 2010, at Al4. 
12. See Facts About the Death Penalty, supra note 9, at 1, 3 (stating that 1138 of 1399 
executions, or 81.34%, took place in the South). 
13. James S. Liebman & Poter Clarke, Minority Practice, Majority Burden: The Death 
Penalty Today, 9 OHIO ST. J. CHIM. LAW 255, 264-65 (2011); RICHAHD C. DIETEH, THE 2% 
DEATtl PENALTY: How A MINORITY OF COUNTIES PHODUCE MOST DEATH CASES /\'!' 
ENORMOUS COSTS TO ALL, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. 1 (2013), available at http://www. 
deathpenaltyinfo. org/ documents/TwoPercentReport. pdf. 
14. DIETER, supra note 1'!, at 10. 
15. Id. at 7. 
16. Id. at 6--7. 
17. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982). 
18. See Innocence: List of Those Freed from Death Row, DEATH PENALTY INFO. C'rR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-list-those-freed-death-row (last visited Feb. 27, 
2015) [hereinafter Innocence List] (identifying 150 individuals who have been exonerated 
from death sentences). 
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not commit. 19 As a result of his poverty, Ford was assigned two 
lawyers to represent him at his capital trial. 20 The lead attorney 
was an oil and gas lawyer who had never tried a case, criminal or 
civil, before a jury.21 The second attorney had been out of law 
school for only two years and worked at an in·surance defense 
firm on slip-and-fall cases. 22 As often happens in capital cases, the 
prosecutors used their peremptory strikes to keep blacks off the 
jury.23 Despite a very weak case against him, Ford-virtually de-
fenseless before an all-white jury-was sentenced to death.21 
Ford is just one of at least 150 people sentenced to death who 
were later exonerated and released. 25 However, other innocent 
people have been executed. Texas executed Carlos DeLuna and 
Cameron Todd Willingham, but it has become clear since their 
executions that they were not guilty of the crimes. 2c Exonerations 
demonstrate the shoddy quality of what passes for "justice" in the 
criminal courts. If the courts cannot get the most basic thing 
right-who is guilty and who is innocent-then how can they ad-
dress more difficult questions regarding whether a human being 
should live or die? 
And, if he looks further, the attorney general will find that the 
intellectually disabled continue to be sentenced to death and exe-
cuted, even though the Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia 
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of the intel-
19. Andrew Cohen, Glenn Ford's First Days of Freedom after 30 Years on Death Row, 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/nationaVarchive/2014/03/glenn-for 
ds-first-days-of-freedom-after-30-years-on-death-row/284396; Andrew Cohen, The Meaning 
of the Exoneration of Glenn Ford, BHENNAN Cm. FOR JUS'l'. (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www. 
brennancenter.org/analysis/meaning-exoneration-glenn-ford; Andrew Cohen, Freedom Af· 
ter 30 Years on Death Row, ATLANTIC (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/nation 
al/ archive/2014/03/freedom -after-30-years-on -death· row/2841 79/. 
20. See Cohen, Freedom After 30 Years on Death Row, supra note 19 ("Both attorneys 
were selected from an alphabetical listing of lawyers at the local bar association."). 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. See id. 
24. See Cohen, The Meaning of the Exoneration of Glenn Ford, supra note 19. 
25. Innocence List, supra note 18. 
26. See ,JMIES S. LIEB!v1AN, THE WRONG CAHLOS: ANATOMY OF A WHONGFUL 
EXECUTION 315-16 (Colum. U. Press 2014); Maurice Passley, Fresh Doubts Over a Texas 
Execution, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2014, at Al; David Grann, Trial By Fire: Did Texas Exe· 
cute An Innocent Man?, NEW YORKEH, Sept. 7, 2009, available at http://www.newyorker. 
com/magazine/2009/09/07 /trial· by-fire. 
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lectually disabled, then referred to as mentally retarded. 21 And he 
will find that people, who through no fault of their own are schiz-
ophrenic, bipolar, brain damaged, or suffer some major mental 
impairment, are being sentenced to death and executed for crimes 
that are bizarre and senseless. 
I. THE HISTORY LEADING TO FURMAN 
The state death penalty before Furman v. Georgia in 1972 is 
arguably one of the darkest and more disgraceful chapters in 
American history. William Henry Furman was a twenty-six-year-
old, African American, intellectually limited, and mentally ill 
man. 
28 He was sentenced to death for an unintentional murder-
committed by the accidental discharge of a .22 caliber pistol 
through the kitchen door of a home as he fled after attempting 
burglary.29 His trial in Savannah, Georgia started at 10 AM and 
ended at 5:10 PM with the imposition of the death penalty.30 His 
lawyer was paid only $150 and not given any funds for investiga-
tion.31 His trial was not that different from ones occurring in Ala-
bama, Arkansas, Texas, Mississippi, and other states at that 
time. Capital punishment then, as it is now, was very much tied 
to race-the oppression of African Americans, carried out by this 
country's criminal courts. 32 
In 1846, Michigan was the first state to abolish the death pen-
alty for murder, followed by Rhode Island in 1852 and Wisconsin 
in 1853.:i:i As prisons developed, many other northern states re-
pealed the death penalty for virtually every crime except mur-
der. 31 That could not be done in the southern states because of 
27. See 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
28. See Brief for Petitioner at 9, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) 
(No. 69-5003), 1971WL134167; Jody Seaborn, In 'Capital Punishment on Trial,' UT's Da-
vid Oshinsky Tahes Clear Look at Death Penalty's Divisive History, STATES!V1AN (Aug. 23. 
2010, 12:30 PM), http://www.statesman.com/news/entertainment/books-literature/in-
ca pital-pun ishmen t-on-trial-u ts-david-oshinsky-/nRxCn/. 
29. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 28, at 2, 6. 
30. See id. at 2, 3. 
31. See id. at 8 n.6. 
32. JUSTIN D. LEVINSON ET AL., DEVALUING DEATH: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ON JURY-ELIGIBLE CITIZENS IN SIX DEATH PENAL'l'Y STATES 3 
(2013), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/LevinsonSmith Young.pdf. 
33. STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 134 (2002). 
34. Id. at 134-35. 
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slavery.35 The slaves were already a captive population. In some 
states, there were more African slaves than there were whites. 
The death penalty was seen as essential to maintaining control 
over the slaves.36 
After the Civil War, southern criminal codes provided that 
crimes were punishable based on both the race of the defendant 
and the race of the victim with the far more severe penalties be-
ing imposed on African Americans who committed crimes against 
whites. 37 For example, Georgia law provided that the rape of a 
white female by a black man "shall be" punishable by death, 
while the rape of a white female by anyone else "was punishable 
by a prison term not less than two nor more than twenty years."38 
However, "[t]he rape of a black was punishable 'by fine and im-
prisonment, at the discretion of the court."'39 
The southern states also perpetuated slavery through "convict 
leasing."rn African Americans were arrested for crimes-often mi-
nor charges such as loitering or not having papers-and then 
leased to coal companies, plantations, railroads and turpentine 
camps.11 In "Slavery by Another Name," Douglas Blackmon de-
scribes how Alabama perpetuated slavery through convict leasing 
all the way until World War Il. 42 In "Worse than Slavery," David 
Oshinsky points out that convict leasing was worse than slavery 
because the slave owners at least had an interest in protecting 
their property, but leased convicts were disposable. 43 Unlike the 
slave owner, the person or company that leased convicts had no 
interest in their nutrition, their health, the quality of their hous-
35. See id. at 142 ("fhe South's retention of capital punishment for blacks was surely 
a direct result of slavery."). 
36. Id. 
37. See A. LEON HIGGINllOTHMI, JR., IN THE MATTER OF' COLOR: HACE IN THE 
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 256 (1978). 
38. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 329-30 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
39. Id. at 330. 
40. See generally DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-
ENSLAVEMENT OF' BLACK AMERICANS F'ROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II 1-10 (2008) 
(discussing a process by which African American prisoners were funneled into unpaid hard 
labor). 
41. Id. at 6-7. 
42. Id. at 9. 
43. See DAVID M. OSHINSKY, WORSE THAN SLAVERY: PARCHMAN FARM AND THE 
0HDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE 37-4 7 (1996). 
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ing or any other aspect of their survival.14 They could literally be 
worked to death and then replaced by other leased convicts.45 
Lynching was also used to maintain racial control after the 
Civil War. At least 4743 people were killed by lynch mobs. 16 More 
than 90% of lynchings took place in the South, and three-fourths 
of the victims were African Americans.47 The death penalty is 
closely related to lynching. As one historian observed: 
Southerners ... discovered that lynchings were untidy and created a 
bad press .... [L]ynchings were increasingly replaced by situations 
in which the Southern legal system prostituted itself to the mob's de-
mand. Responsible officials begged would-be lynchers to 'let the law 
take its course,' thus tacitly promising that there would be a quick 
trial and the death penalty .... [S]uch proceedings 'retained the es-
sence of mob murder, shedding only its outward forms'. 48 
In the Scottsboro Case, nine black youths charged with the 
rape of two white women were sentenced to death after brief tri-
als before all-white, all-male juries.49 Over the course of three tri-
als, the youths were prosecuted in groups, while mobs outside the 
courtroom demanded the death penalty.50 The youths were repre-
sented by two lawyers who agreed to take the cases on the morn-
ing of the first trial; one was a drunk and the other was senile. 51 
When there was a national outcry about the injustice of the death 
penalty being imposed at such summary trials with only perfunc-
tory legal representation, the people of Scottsboro did not under-
stand the reaction. 52 The trials were seen as an improvement over 
lynchings even though the outcomes were a foregone conclusion.53 
However, there was often little difference between lynchings 
carried out by the mob and "legal lynchings" that took place in 
courtrooms. A man was hung immediately after a trial in Ken-
44. Id. at 44. 
45. Id. 
46. ROilERT M. BOHM, DEA'rHqUEST: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY AND PHACTICE 
OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (Pamela Chester ed., 4th ed. 2012). 
47. Id. 
48. DANT. CARTER, SCOTTSIJORO: A THAGEDY OF THE AMEHICAN Soun! 115 (La. State 
Univ. Press rev. ed., 2007). 
49. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 50 (1932); CARTER, supra note 48, at 5-6. 
50. Powell, 287 U.S. at 50; see CARTER, supra note 48, at 111. 
51. CARTER, supra note 48, at 18-19, 22-23. 
52. Id. at 49-50, 105. 
53. Id. at 113-14. 
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tucky that lasted less than an hour. 54 One state newspaper, the 
Louisville Courier-Journal, noted the progress in an editorial, 
saying, "The fact ... that Kentucky was saved the mortification of 
a lynching by an indignant multitude, bent upon avenging the 
innocent victim of the crime, is a matter for special congratula-
tion."55 The paper also observed that since a Negro had raped a 
white woman, "no other result could have been reached, however 
prolonged the trial."56 Between 1930, when the Department of 
Justice started keeping statistics, and 1972 when Furman was 
decided, 455 people were put to death for the crime of rape; 405 
were African American-one of the more damning statistics in 
the nation's history. 57 
The Supreme Court struck down the death penalty in Furman 
v. Georgia because of the arbitrariness, randomness, and discrim-
ination in its application. 58 Justice Stewart said that of all those 
eligible for the death penalty, it was imposed only on a 
"capriciously selected random handful," and concluded that the 
Eighth Amendment prevented "this unique penalty to be so wan-
tonly and so freakishly imposed."59 As he put it, "These death sen-
tences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck 
by lightning is cruel and unusual."60 Actually, being sentenced to 
death was not like being struck by lightning; lightning is much 
more random. The death penalty was most often imposed in cer-
tain jurisdictions in the South and upon certain people-racial 
54. GEOIWE c. WHIGH'l', RACIAL VIOLENCE IN KENTUCKY 1865-1940: LYNCHINGS, Mon 
HULE, AND "LEGAL LYNCHINGS" 252 (Louisiana Paperback ed., 1996). 
55. Id. at 253 (internal quotations omitted). 
56. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
57. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 364 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("A total of 
3,859 persons have been executed since 1930, of whom 1,751 were white and 2,066 were 
Negro. Of the executions, 3,334 were for murder; 1,664 of the executed murderers were 
white and 1,630 were Negro; 455 persons, including 48 whites and 405 Negroes, were exe-
cuted for rape.") (footnotes omitted). 
58. The justices in the majority in Furman concluded that the death penalty was be-
ing imposed so discriminatorily, arbitrarily, and infrequently that any given death sen-
tence was cruel and unusual. Id. at 249-52 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 364-66 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring); id. at 291-95 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 311-13 (White, J., 
concurring). Justice Brennan also concluded that because "the deliberate extinguishment 
of human life by the State is uniquely degrading to human dignity," it was inconsistent 
with "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Id. 
at 269-70, 291 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
59. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, .J., concurring). 
60. Id. at 309. 
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minorities, poor people with inadequate legal representation, and 
the marginalized. 61 
II. THE MODERN DEATH PENALTY 
Remarkably, just four years after Furman, the Supreme Court 
held that the death penalty statutes of three states were constitu-
tional.62 The Court disregarded history, reality, and the limita-
tions of the court system, and held that by slightly tweaking their 
death penalty statutes, the states had miraculously overcome 
centuries of race discrimination and arbitrary infliction of the 
death penalty upon the poorest and most marginalized people in 
the society.63 The changes made were slight. Death penalty trials 
are now bi-furcated trials, with one phase on guilt or innocence 
and the other on sentencing.6·1 Prosecutors must prove at least one 
aggravating circumstance to "narrow the class of persons eligible 
for death penalty."65 Defendants are allowed to introduce mitigat-
ing factors that might be a basis for a sentence less than death. 66 
These small changes failed to eliminate arbitrariness and dis-
crimination, an impossible task.67 
61. Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst 
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836, 1840-42, 1844 (1994). 
62. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding a death 
penalty statute enacted by Georgia in 1973); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259-60 
(1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding a Florida statute); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 
(1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding a Texas statute). The Court found unconstitutional 
Louisiana and North Carolina statutes providing for mandatory imposition of the death 
penalty. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. 
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
63. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162-64 (describing Georgia's new statutory death penalty 
scheme that was designed to comply with the requirements of Furman v. Georgia); Prof-
fitt, 428 U.S. at 247 (describing the Florida's legislature's attempt to bring its death penal-
ty statute into line with constitutional requirements); Jurek, 428 U.S. at 268-69 (explain-
ing how, in response to Furman v. Georgia, Texas narrowed the scope of its capital 
punishment laws to only five categories of intentional and knowing homicide, and modi-
fied its jury procedures). 
64. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 163, 190-95. 
65. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c) (2012); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988). 
66. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206. 
67. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1144-45 (1994) (Illackmun, J., dissenting) ("Ex-
perience has taught us that the constitutional goal of eliminating arbitrariness and dis-
crimination from the administration of death can never be achieved without compromising 
an equally essential component of fundamental fairness-individualized sentencing.") (ci-
tations omitted). 
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Different practices by prosecutors contribute to the arbitrari-
ness. The two most important decisions made in every death pen-
alty case-whether to seek the death penalty, and whether to of-
fer a plea bargain-are completely in the hands of prosecutorS.68 
They are unregulated and subject to no judicial review. 69 There 
are many prosecutors who never seek the .de-ath penalty, others 
who seldom seek it, and others who seek it in every case in which 
it could be imposed. Most death penalty cases are resolved with 
plea bargains (depending on whether the prosecution is willing to 
offer it and whether the defendant is willing to accept it).70 Some 
prosecutors will offer a plea bargain allowing the defendant to 
plead guilty in exchange for a sentence less than death, usually 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 71 Mentally im-
paired and intellectually limited defendants may not understand 
their options.72 They may reject the plea offer and end up on 
death row.n 
A small number of aggressive prosecutors in the counties that 
account for so many death sentences refuse to offer plea bargains 
and try to obtain the death penalty at every opportunity. 71 They 
are usually successful in jurisdictions in which defendants facing 
the death penalty receive very poor legal representation. 75 Be-
tween 1976 and the end of 2014, 122 people sentenced to death in 
Harris County, which includes Houston, have been executed, 
68. JOHN G. MORGAN, COMPTHOLLER OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF RESEARCH, 
TENNESSEE'S DEATH I'ENAU!'Y: COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES 13 (2004). 
69. See Nicci Lovre-Laughlin, Lethal Decisions: Examining the Role of Prosecutorial 
Discretion in Capital Cases in South Dalwta and the Federal Justice System, 50 S.D. L. 
REV. 550, 569 (2005). 
70. See John H. Blume, Plea Bargaining and the Right to Effective Assistance of Coun-
sel: Where the Rubber Hits the Road in Capital Cases, 25 FED. SENT'G REP. 122, 122 (2012). 
71. See WELSH s. WHITE, LITIGA'l'ING IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH: DEFENSE ATTOHNEYS 
IN CAPITAL CASES 145-46 (2006); WELSH S. WllITE, THE DEATH PENAU!'Y IN THE NINETIES: 
AN EXAMINATION OF nm MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 54-55 (1991); see also 
Nick Quaife, Colbert Co. Man Faces Trial After Turning Down Plea Deal, WAFF NEWS 
(Jan 17, 2015, 12:03 AM), http://www.waff.com/story/27874128/colbert-co-man-faces-trial-
after-turning-down-plea-deal. 
72. See Blume, supra note 70, at 123. 
73. See id. at 122. 
74. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment: The Case for Eliminat-
ing Counties' Role in the Death Penalty, 63 VAND. L. REV. 307, 316-18 (2010); see also 
Mitch Mitchell, Arlington Woman's Execution Set for Wednesday, STAR-TELEGRAM (Sept. 
15, 2014, 5:44 PM), http://www.star-telegram.com/news/local/crime/article 3873321.html. 
75. See Bright, supra note 61, at 1840. 
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more people than executed by any state except Texas itself. 76 Har-
ris County judges have made the job easier by appointing incom-
petent lawyers to represent people facing the death penalty.77 
And, after they are sentenced to death, the condemned are as-
signed equally bad lawyers to represent them in post-conviction 
d. 78 procee mgs. 
The race of the defendant and the race of the victim continue to 
influence the imposition of the death penalty. The courts remain 
the part of American society least affected by the civil rights 
movement of the mid-twentieth century. Many courtrooms in the 
South today look no different than they did in the 1950s. The 
judge is white, the prosecutors are white, the court-appointed 
lawyers are white, and, even in communities with substantial Af-
rican American populations, the jury is often all white. 79 It is well-
known and well documented that a person of color is more likely 
than a white person to be stopped by police, to be abused during 
that stop, to be arrested after the stop, to be denied bail when 
brought to court, and to receive a severe sentence, whether it is 
jail instead of probation or the death penalty instead of life im-
prisonment without the possibility of parole. 80 
76. County of Conviction for Executed Offenders, TEX. DEP''r OF CHIM. JUST., www.td 
cj.state.tx.us/death_row/dr_county_conviction_executed.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2015) 
(listing number of executed offenders by county of execution); Executed Offenders, TEX. 
DEP''l' OF CRIM. JUST., www.tdcj.state.tx.us/death_row/dr_executed_offenders.html (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2015) (listing individual offenders executed in Texas). 
77. For example, one lawyer repeatedly appointed by judges in Houston had twenty 
clients sentenced to death due largely to his failure to "conduct even rudimentary investi-
gations." Adam Liptak, A Lawyer Known Best For Losing Capital Cases, N.Y. TIMES, May 
18, 2010, at A13. Houston judges repeatedly appointed Ron Mock, despite his poor perfor-
mance in capital cases. Sara Rimer & Raymond Bonner, Texas Lawyer's Death Row Record 
a Concern, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2000, at 1. Sixteen people represented by Mock were sen-
tenced to death. Andrew Tilghman, State Bar Suspends Troubled Local Lawyer, Rous. 
CHRON., Feb. 12, 2005, at Bl. Judges also appointed Joe Frank Cannon, who was known 
for trying cases like "greased lightning" and not always being able to stay awake during 
trials; ten people represented by Cannon were sentenced to death. Paul M. Barrett, Law-
yer's Fast Work on Death Cases Raises Doubts About the System, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 
1994, at Al. 
78. Stephen B. Bright, Elected Judges and The Death Penalty In Texas: Why Full Ha-
beas Corpus Review By Independent Federal Judges Is Indispensable to Protecting Consti-
tutional Rights, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1805, 1808-09 (2000); Stephen B. Bright, Death in Texas: 
Not Even The Pretense of Fairness, CHAMPION, July 1999, at 1, 2. 
79. See Shaila Dewan, Blaclls Still Being Blocked from Juries in the South, Study 
Finds, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2010, at A14. 
80. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERA'l'ION IN 
'l'HE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 16 (2010); AMYE. LEHMAN & VESLA M. WEAVEH, ARHES'l'ING 
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Prosecutors are usually successful in preventing or minimizing 
the participation of racial minorities in capital trials. They con-
tinue to use their peremptory jury strikes against minorities, as 
has long been the history in the criminal courts.81 Exclusion of 
people of color was explicitly allowed by the _Supreme Court of the 
United States in 1965.82 The Court did not purport to prohibit it 
until a quarter of a century ago when it held in Batson v. Ken-
tucky that strikes based on race violate the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.83 
But, as predicted by Justice Thurgood Marshall at the time it 
was decided,84 Batson has failed completely to prevent discrimina-
tion in jury selection. Under the procedures adopted in Batson, a 
defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory 
challenge has been exercised on the basis of race that may be in-
ferred from a pattern of striking blacks or other evidence. 85 Upon 
such a showing, the prosecution must give a race-neutral expla-
nation for striking the juror in question.86 However, the ultimate 
burden of proving racial motivation rests with, and never shifts 
from, the party challenging the strike.87 Finally, the trial judge 
must determine, in light of all of the evidence, whether the de-
fendant has shown intentional racial discrimination by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.88 For a Batson challenge to succeed, a ra-
CITIZENSHIP: THE DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL 40-43 
(2014); Cynthia E. Jones, Give Us Free: Addressing Racial Disparities in Bail Determina· 
tions, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 919, 940-41 (2013). 
81. See Dewan, supra note 79. 
82. The Court said in Swain v. Alabama, "[W]e cannot hold that the striking of Ne· 
groes in a particular case is a denial of equal protection of the laws. In the quest for an 
impartial and qualified jury, Negro and white, Protestant and Catholic, are alike subject 
to being challenged without cause." 380 U.S. 202, 221 (1965). 'l'he Court said only proof 
that a prosecutor "in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and 
whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is responsible for the removal of Negroes ... 
with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries ... might support a reasonable 
inference that Negroes are excluded from juries for reasons wholly unrelated to the out· 
come of the particular case on trial and that the peremptory system is being used to deny 
the Negro the same right and opportunity to participate in the administration of justice 
enjoyed by the white population." Id. at 223-24. 
83. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97-98 (1986). 
84. Id. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
85. Id. at 96-97. 
86. Id. at 97-98. 
87. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995). 
88. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98; see also Purhett, 514 U.S. at 767 (describing the strike pro· 
cess). 
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cially discriminatory result is not sufficient; instead, the strike 
must be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.89 
In making a Batson challenge, "the defendant's practical bur-
den [is] to make a liar out of the prosecutor" by showing that s/he 
struck jurors based on their race and then lied by giving pre-
textual reasons for them. 90 As United States District Court Judge 
Mark Bennett has observed, "Most trial court judges will only 
find such deceit in extreme situations."91 One might suspect this 
is particularly true when judges have been prosecutors before be-
ing elevated to the bench and the prosecutors before them are 
their former colleagues. Some judges may have routinely struck 
minority jurors when they were prosecutors. Others may simply 
have a good working relationship with prosecutors who come be-
fore them frequently and are unwilling to accuse those prosecu-
tors of discrimination. Lastly, some judges and prosecutors may 
have conscious or unconscious racial biases.92 
Many prosecutors have resisted Batson since it was decided. 
Just a year after the decision, a senior Philadelphia prosecutor 
told other prosecutors in his office at a training session to use 
peremptory strikes to remove black people because, among other 
reasons, "blacks from the low-income areas are less likely to con-
vict."93 He went on to explain how to give a "race neutral" reason 
for the racially based strike: 
When you do have a black juror, you question them at length. And 
on this little sheet that you have, mark something down that you can 
articulate later if something happens ... and question them and say, 
"Well the woman had a kid about the same age as the defendant and 
I thought she'd be sympathetic to him," or "She's unemployed and I 
just don't like unemployed people" ... So, sometimes under that line 
you may want to ask more questions of those people so it gives you 
more ammunition to make an articulable reason as to why you are 
striking them, not for race. 9·1 
89. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93. 
90. Munson v. Texas, 774 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex. App. 1989). 
91. Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: 
The Problems of Judge-Dominated Vair Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed 
Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 149, 162-63 (2010) (citing examples of dubious reasons 
upheld by judges as "race neutral"). 
92. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
93. Wilson v. Beard, 426 F.3d 653, 657 (3d Cir. 2005). 
94. Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson's Net to Ensnare More Than 
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After calling the Batson process a "charade," one court de-
scribed it as follows: "The State may provide the trial court with a 
series of pat race-neutral reasons .... [W]e wonder if the reasons 
can be given without a smile. Surely, new prosecutors are given a 
manual, probably entitled, 'Handy Race-Neutral Explanations' or 
'20 Time-Tested Race-Neutral Explanations."'95 And indeed, it lat-
er came to light that North Carolina pros-ecutors are provided 
with just such a "cheat sheet" of race-neutral reasons to justify 
their strikes.96 The North Carolina Conference of District Attor-
neys distributed a one-page handout titled "Batson Justifications: 
Articulating Juror Negatives" at a state-wide trial advocacy 
course called "Top Gun II."97 It contained a list of reasons prosecu-
tors could proffer in response to a Batson objection. Among the 
reasons: 
Age ... 
Attitude-air of defiance, lack of eye contact with Prosecutor, 
eye contact with defendant or defense attorney 
Body Language-arms folded, leaning away from questioner, 
obvious boredom ... 98 
Most of these reasons are based on subjective assessments of 
demeanor that apply to almost all jurors. Most important, it is 
usually impossible for a judge to know whether they are true. 99 A 
North Carolina court found that a prosecutor had used reasons 
from the list to justify striking African Americans in four capital 
cases.
100 The court also found that in capital cases in North Caro-
lina, prosecutors struck African Americans at approximately dou-
the Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 COHNELL L. REV. 
1075, 1079 (2011) (quoting from videotape of Assistant District Attorney Jack McMahon 
conducting a training program for Philadelphia prosecutors). 
95. People v. Randall, 671 N.E.2d 60, 65 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). 
96. See Order Granting Motions for Appropriate Relief at 73, irir 68, 70, North Caroli-
na v. Golphin, 97 CRS 47314-15 (Dec. 13, 2012) (Cumberland County) [hereinafter Order 
Granting Appropriate Relief] available at http://www.aclu.org/fi!es/assets/rja_order_l2·13 
-12.pdf (consolidating three cases with defendants Tilmon Golphin, Christina Walters, and 
Quintel Augustine). 
97. Id. at 73-74, ilif 68-71. 
98. Id. at 74, ii 71 
99. See, e.g., People v. Mai, 305 P.3d 1175, 1219, 1221 (Cal. 2013) (holding that a pros· 
ecutor's assertions about a juror's casual dress and "bored" and disinterested manner were 
race-neutral). 
100. Order Granting Appropriate Relief, supra note 96, at 74-77, irir 72-79. 
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ble the rate they struck other potential jurors. 101 The probability 
of such a disparity occurring in a race-neutral process is less than 
one in ten trillion. 102 The court found a history of "resistance" by 
prosecutors "to permit greater participation on juries by African 
Americans."103 
Prosecutors in states with a history of discrimination have 
found other ways to prevent or minimize minority participation 
on capital juries. Capital cases may be prosecuted in federal court 
if there is any "federal interest" that can be invoked for trying the 
case in federal court. 101 In state jurisdictions with substantial mi-
nority populations, such as New Orleans Parish, Louisiana, 
which is about 60% African American, capital cases may be tried 
in federal court where jury pools come from a larger geographical 
area that is only 24% African American. 105 This practice can also 
be seen in Richmond, Virginia; Prince George's County, Mary-
land; and St. Louis, Missouri. 106 In these jurisdictions, when a 
capital crime occurs in a locale with a higher minority population, 
it is more likely to be prosecuted in federal court in order to ob-
tain a jury pool with fewer minorities. 107 
The Supreme Court has held that states must minimize the 
risk of race coming into play in the decisions that lead to imposi-
tion of the death penalty. 108 This raises the question of how much 
racial bias is acceptable in the process through which courts con-
demn people to die. With the long history of slavery, lynchings, 
convict leasing, segregation, racial oppression, and now mass in-
carceration, surely states should eliminate any chance that racial 
prejudice might play a role. But there is only one way to do that: 
eliminate the death penalty. 
101. Id. at 143, 153, iii! 223, 254. The Court found that prosecutors statewide struck 
52.8% of eligible black venire members and 25. 7% of all other eligible venire members. Id. 
at 153, ii 254. 
102. Id. at 153, ir 254. 
103. Id. at 4. 
104. See G. Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith, 1'he Racial Geography of the Federal Death 
Penalty, 85 WASH. L. REV. 425, 480 (2010). 
105. Id. at 446-47. 
106. Id. at 450-51, 454, 458. 
107. See id. at 445, 490. 
108. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1986); see also McC!eskey v. Kemp, 481 
U.S. 279, 305, 308, 313 (1987). 
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The death penalty is also imposed almost exclusively on the 
poor. 109 The remarkably poor quality of legal representation in 
some capital cases and the even more remarkable indifference of 
courts is illustrated by the case of Robert Wayne Holsey, an Afri-
can American executed by Georgia on Dece_mber 9, 2014. uo Holsey 
was represented at his trial by a lawyer. who drank a quart of 
vodka every night of the trial and was preparing to be sued, crim-
inally prosecuted, and disbarred for stealing client funds. 1u Hol-
sey's other court-appointed lawyer had no experience in defending 
capital cases and was given no direction by the alcoholic lawyer in 
charge of the case except during trial, when she was told to cross-
examine an expert on DNA and give the closing argument at the 
sentencing phase. u 2 The lawyers failed to present mitigating evi-
dence that might well have convinced the jury to impose life im-
prisonment instead of death: Holsey was intellectually limited 
and as a child had been "subjected to abuse so severe, so frequent, 
and so notorious that his neighbors called his childhood home 'the 
Torture Chamber."'113 
James Fisher, Jr. spent twenty-six and one-half years in the 
custody of Oklahoma-most of it on death row-without ever hav-
ing a fair and reliable determination of his guilt. 114 The lawyer as-
signed to represent him tried his case and twenty-four others, in-
cluding another capital murder case, during September 1983.115 
The lawyer made no opening statement or closing argument at ei-
ther the guilt or sentencing phase and uttered only nine words 
during the entire sentencing phase. 116 On appeal, the Oklahoma 
Court of Criminal Appeals pronounced itself "deeply disturbed by 
109. See Death Penalty Representation, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.death 
penaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-representation (last visited Feb. 27, 2015). 
110. Tracy Connor & Shamar Walters, Georgia Executes Robert Holsey After Supreme 
Court Denies IQ Appeal, NBC NEWS (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/leth 
al-injection/georgia-executes-robert-holsey-after-supreme-court-denies-iq-appeal-n264921. 
111. Marc Bookman, This Man's Alcoholic Lawyer Botched His Case. Georgia Executed 




113. Holsey v. Warden, 694 F.3d 1230, 1275 (11th Cir. 2012) (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
114. Is James Fisher Guilty? After 2 Death Sentences, 26 Years in Custody We'll Never 
Know Because of His Ineffective Lawyers, SECOND CLASS JUSTICE (Oct. 23, 2010), http:// 
www.secondclassjustice.coinl?p=198. 
115. Fisher v. Gibson, 282 F.3d 1283, 1293 (10th Cir. 2002). 
116. Id. at 1289. 
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defense counsel's lack of participation and advocacy during the 
sentencing stage," but it was not disturbed enough to reverse the 
conviction or sentence. 117 
Nineteen years later, a United States Court of Appeals set 
aside the conviction and death sentence, finding that Fisher's 
lawyer was "grossly inept," had "sabotaged" Fisher's defense by 
repeatedly reiterating the state's version of events, and was dis-
loyal by "exhibiting actual doubt and hostility toward his client's 
case."118 
These are but two of the many examples of scandalous repre-
sentation provided to poor people facing the death penalty. 
Ronald Wayne Frye, executed by North Carolina, was represented 
by a lawyer who drank twelve shots of rum a day during the pen-
alty phase of the trial. 119 And there are other cases of intoxicated 
lawyers, drug-addicted lawyers, lawyers who referred to their cli-
ents with racial slurs in front of the jury, lawyers who were not in 
court when crucial witnesses testified, and lawyers who did not 
even know their clients' names. 120 Lawyers assigned to represent 
condemned inmates have missed the statute of limitations for fil-
ing federal habeas corpus petitions in eighty cases, depriving 
their clients of any review of their cases by federal courts. 121 
How do the courts, the bar, and the legal profession as a whole 
allow lawyers to continue to practice when they cannot file their 
papers on time, which is about as basic as it gets when it comes to 
practicing law? Courts and prosecutors appear to have come to 
accept this gross ineptness by capital defense counsel. It has be-
come part of the culture. They are indifferent to injustice. 
117. Fisher v. State, 739 P.2d 523, 525 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987). 
118. Fisher, 282 F.3d at 1298, 1300, 1308. 
119. Jeffrey Gettleman, Execution Ends Debatable Case, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2001), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2001/aug/31/news/mn-405 77. 
120. See Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance 
After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2169-70 (2013); Kenneth Williams, The 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: What's Wrong with it and How to Fix It, 33 
CONN. L. REV. 919, 933-34 (2001); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drinhs, Drugs, and Drowsiness: 
The Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice 
Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425, 455-58 (1996). 
121. Lugo v. Secretary, 750 F.3d 1198, 1216 (11th Cir. 2014) (Martin, J., concurring) 
(listing thirty-four capital cases in Florida in which lawyers missed the statute of limita-
tions); Ken Armstrong, When Lawyers Stumble, Only Their Clients Fall, WASH. POST, Nov. 
16, 2014, at Al. 
--
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Another reason for arbitrariness is the impossibility of measur-
ing the mental state or level of intellectual functioning of a person 
accused of a capital crime. In some states, the jury is asked to de-
• l')'} 
termine whether the defendant is a future danger to society"" or 
whether the crime was outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible 
and inhuman. 123 Are juries capable of discerning whether an intel-
lectually disabled person is also capable of meeting these ele-
ments? Are juries able to determine whether a profoundly men-
tally ill person is so impaired that their culpability is reduced? Or 
does the person's mental illness make them a future danger and 
is thus a reason for imposing death? 
This is not like deciding who ran the red light, who fired the 
shot, or other factual questions that juries decide. Psychiatrists 
and psychologists are not in agreement with regard to issues of 
mental impairment and intellectual disability. 124 The prosecution 
will always present an expert who says the person is malingering, 
even in cases in which, long before any criminal act, there was bi-
zarre behavior, paranoia, delusions, treatment with psychotropic 
drugs, hospitalizations, electroshock therapy, suicide attempts, or 
self-mutilation. 125 
In his dissenting opinion in Atkins u. Virginia, Justice Scalia 
predicted that many defendants would feign mental retarda-
tion.126 But if defendants are going to pretend to be mentally re-
tarded, they really have to start planning at a young age. One of 
the elements of mental retardation is that the person shows func-
122. See, e.g., TEX. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. art. 37.071, § 2(b)(l) (2014) (indicating that 
jury must answer whether there is "a probability that the defendant would commit crimi· 
nal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society"). 
123. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(7) (2012). 
124. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985) ("[P]sychiatrists disagree widely and 
frequently on what constitutes mental illness ... and on likelihood of future dangerous· 
ness."). 
125. See, e.g., State v. Moody, 94 P.3d 1119, 1148 (Ariz. 2004) (recounting that the psy· 
chiatrist for the prosecution in the capital murder trial testified that the defendant was 
malingering, not insane); Ex parte Thomas (No. WR-69859-01), 2009 WL 693606, at **1-3 
(Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 18, 2009) (explaining that the defendant long exhibited bizarre be-
havior, self-mutilated, suffered from delusions and paranoia, took psychotropic drugs, was 
hospitalized, and attempted suicide before committing murder but a psychiatrist and psy· 
chologist both diagnosed him as malingering). 
126. 536 U.S. 304, 353-54 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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tional deficits during the developmental period, that is, during 
childhood. 121 
It is hard to imagine that Andre Lee Thomas, who has gouged 
out both his eyes and committed truly bizarre crimes, was malin-
gering.128 Thomas, sentenced to death in Texas, suffers from 
schizophrenia and psychotic delusions. 129 Thomas stabbed and 
killed his wife and two children, acting upon a voice that he 
thought was God's telling him that he needed to kill them using 
three different knives so as not to "cross contaminate" their blood 
and "allow the demons inside them to live."130 He used a different 
knife on each one and carved out the children's hearts and part of 
his wife's lung, which he had mistaken for her heart, and stuffed 
them into his pockets. 131 He then stabbed himself in the heart, 
which he thought would assure the death of the demons that had 
inhabited his wife and children. 132 
After being hospitalized for his chest wound, he was taken to 
jail, where he gave the police a calm, complete, and coherent ac-
count of his activities and his reasons for them. 133 In jail, five days 
after the killings, Thomas read in the Bible, "If the right eye of-
fends thee, pluck it out."131 Thomas gouged out his right eye. 135 Af-
ter being sentenced to death and sent to death row, he gouged out 
his left eye and ate it. 13G 
Florida executed John Ferguson, a black man, who suffered 
from schizophrenia, in 2013, even though he believed that he was 
the Prince of God and that after execution, he would be resurrect-
ed and return to this planet in that capacity.137 The Court of Ap-
127. Id. at 308 n.3 (providing definitions of mental retardation from the American As-
sociation on Mental Retardation and the American Psychiatric Association, both of which 
require manifestations of significantly subaverage intellectual functioning and limitations 
in adaptive skills before age eighteen). 
128. Ex parte Thomas, 2009 WL 693606 at *3 n.11. 
129. Id. at *L 
130. Id. at *2. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at *3. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Marc Bookman, How Crazy Is Too Crazy To Be Executed?, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 
12, 2013, 6:02 AM), www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/02/andre-thomas-death-penalty-
mental-illness-texas. 
137. David Ovalle, Miami Killer John Errol Ferguson Executed, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 5, 
111111111 
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peals for the Eleventh Circuit treated this as nothing more than 
an unusual religious belief: 
While Ferguson's thoughts about what happens after death may 
seem extreme to many people, nearly every major world religion-
from Christianity to Zoroastrianism-envisions some kind of contin-
uation of life after death, often including resurrection. Ferguson's be-
lief in his ultimate corporeal resurrection may differ in degree, but it 
does not necessarily differ in kind, from the beliefs of millions of 
Americans.138 
The court warned against treating unusual religious beliefs as 
proof of mental illness. 139 But religious delusions and obsessions 
are frequent manifestations of mental illness. 140 The court's hold-
ing was merely an effort by judges to gloss over the fact that Flor-
ida and other states are executing people who are out of touch 
with reality. 
CONCLUSION 
The death penalty today is questioned by many people. Jimmy 
Carter, who signed it into law in Georgia, recently raised ques-
tions, saying he was now convinced that the death penalty is no 
longer appropriate. 141 Justice Stevens, the only living member of 
the 1976 Supreme Court which upheld the death penalty, recent-
ly came to the conclusion, "The imposition of the death penalty 
represents 'the pointless and needless extinction of life with only 
marginal contributions to any discernible social or public purpos-
es. A penalty with such negligible returns to the State [is] patent-
ly excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative of the 
2013, 8:30 PM), www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami·dade/article1953840. 
html; Emergency Resolution in Opposition to the Scheduled Execution of .John Ferguson, 
A Mentally Ill Florida Death Row Inmate, NAT'L LAWYEHS GUILD (Oct. 2012). 
138. Ferguson v. Secretary, 716 F.3d 1315, 1342 (11th Cir. 2013). 
139. Id. at 1343. 
140. See Ronald Siddle et al., Religious Delusions in Patients Admitted to Hospital with 
Schizophrenia, 37 Soc. PSYCHIATHY & PSYCHIATHIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 130 (2002). 
141. .Jimmy Carter, Remarks by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter at the National 
Symposium on the Modern Death Penalty in America (Nov. 12, 2013), https://www.carter 
center.org/news/editorials_speeches/death-penalty-speech-111213.html; National Sympo-
sium on the Modern Death Penalty, AM. BAH Ass'N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
individual_rights/projects/death_penalty_due_process_review_project/national_syposium_ 
death_penalty_carter_center.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2015) (including videos of presen-
tations by President Carter and others at the symposium). 
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Eighth Amendment."'142 Justice Powell voted to uphold the death 
penalty in Furman and Gregg, and wrote the majority opinion in 
McCleskey v. Kemp, which upheld the death penalty by a 5-4 vote 
despite the racial disparities in its application in Georgia. 113 After 
retiring from the Court, he told his biographer that he regretted 
both his vote in that case and that the United States still had the 
death penalty. 141 Five states-New Jersey in 2007, New Mexico in 
2009, Illinois in 2011, Connecticut in 2012, and Maryland in 
2013-have repealed the death penalty. 145 The New York Court of 
Appeals held that state's death penalty unconstitutional,146 after 
nine years of having the death penalty in New York and spending 
millions of dollars to put seven people on death row, none of 
whom were executed. 117 And governors of three states-Colorado, 
Oregon, and Washington-have declared moratoria on the death 
penalty. 148 
The end of the death penalty is inevitable, but the question is, 
how much longer? Justice Goldberg said, "the deliberate, institu-
tionalized taking of human life by the state is the greatest con-
ceivable degradation to the dignity of the human personality."119 
The death penalty is not only degrading to the person who is tied 
down and put down, but it is degrading to the society that carries 
142. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 86 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring)). 
143. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312-13 (1987); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 
153, 187 (1976); Furman, 408 U.S. at 414, 461-65 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
144. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY 451 (1994); 
Justice Powell's New Wisdom, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 11, 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06 
I 11/opinion/j ustice-powell-s-new-wisdom. html. 
145. States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
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it out. It coarsens society, telling future generations that prob-
lems can be solved with more violence. 
The Constitutional Court of South Africa, in deciding on the 
constitutionality of that nation's death penalty, said that South 
Africa was a nation in transition from hatred to understanding, 
and from vengeance to reconciliation. 150 In the society South Afri-
cans were building, the court ruled, there was no place for the 
death penalty. 151 We are being asked to decide that question in 
the United States. Of course, crime cannot go unpunished, and it 
does not go unpunished in the eighteen states that have abolished 
the death penalty or in the vast majority of counties in the United 
States which have not imposed a single death sentence since 
1976.152 Society must be protected, but incapacitation of those who 
commit crimes is possible in "super maximum" prisons with sen-
tences as long as life imprisonment without the possibility of pa-
role. What purpose is the primitive penalty of death serving in a 
modern society? When we look closely at the issues-race, pov-
erty, arbitrariness, conviction of the innocent, mental illness, and 
intellectual disability-from both a moral and practical stand-
point, it will not be long before we join South Africa and the rest 
of the civilized world in making permanent, absolute, and une-
quivocal the injunction: "Thou shall not kill." 
150. See State v. Mahwanyane 1995 (2) SACR 1 (CC) at 85 (S. Afr.). 
151. Id. at 184. 
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